Abstract

In this paper, we provide an evidence-based theory to explain how partners forge a

cooperative relationship when both parties have the liberty to unilaterally terminate

the match. We utilize laboratory methods to gather insights on the evolution of co-

operation in a voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma game (VSRPD). We

observe behavioral patterns that are at odds with out-for-tat (OFT) which, based on

the VSRPD literature, is a disciplinary device that helps facilitate mutual coopera-

tion in the long run. Our Pro-Partnership Proposition is formulated to accommodate

the observation that human subjects often favor a more forgiving stay-but-act-like-a-

stranger move instead of OFT to punish norm violators. A new class of equilibria,

called the CoDe-indierent equilibria, is introduced to address the within-match re-

wards and punishments found in the data.

Time

5月30日（周四）14:30-15:30

Speaker

Chun-Lei Yang is currently a professor in Nanjing Audit University and won the title of "Changjiang Scholar" in 2016. He received his PhD degree in economics from the University of Dortmund in 1993. His main research area is experimental and behavioral economics. Courses taught: Microeconomics, Game theory, Industrial organization, Theory of contract, Supermodularity models.

Venue

信息管理与工程学院308室

上海财经大学（第三教学楼西侧）

上海市杨浦区武东路100号