Abstract

Involving suppliers deep inthe supply chain is critical for the success of environmental and socialresponsibility (ESR) initiatives. Administering ESR programs throughout acomplex supply network, however, is challenging. In this paper, we apply abilateral bargaining framework to analyze to what extent an ESR initiatorshould directly engage higher-tier suppliers, as opposed to delegating theassurance of ESR compliance to its first-tier suppliers. Our bargainingframework not only generalizes the conventional Shapley value approach byallowing the flexibility of modeling imbalanced power distribution among thefirms, but also provides an explicit way of implementing the resulting gainsharing among the firms through negotiated contract terms. We show that theeventual structure of negotiation relationships can be derived by finding ashortest path tree in the supply network with the arc cost defined as amonotone function of the negotiating parties' relative bargaining power. Thesedevelopments allow us to analyze ESR implementation in generally extendedsupply networks. 

Time

1月2日（周三）14:00-15:00

Speaker

Chengzhang Li isa Ph.D. candidate in Operations Management at the Krannert School ofManagement, Purdue University. Previously, he received his bachelor degree inMechanical Engineering and Automation from Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Hisresearch interests center around supply chain management in the presence ofuncertainty, ambiguity and strategic behavior. More specifically, his workfocuses on network design for responsible sourcing, pricing and inventorymanagement with product substitution and ambiguous information.

Venue

信息管理与工程学院102室

上海财经大学（第三教学楼西侧）

上海市杨浦区武东路100号