Abstract

In a framework of contest design, we study capacity-constrained competition and analyze its resulting revenue shares. Our analysis contrasts the near-symmetric case, where rms have similar supply sizes, and the extremely asymmetric case, where one large rm dominates the market. In particular, we show that while in the near-symmetric case simple contests provide near optimal equilibrium revenues for all sellers, in the asymmetric case a large rm can design more complicated contests that result in disproportionally low equilibrium revenues for her smaller opponents.

Time

9月19日（周三）14:00-15:00

Speaker

Ron Lavi is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management at Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, where he has been since 2006. He has completed his Ph.D. in computer science at the Hebrew University, and his post-doctoral studies at the California Institute of Technology.

His research focuses on topics on the border of theoretical computer science and economics, mainly in auction theory, algorithmic game theory, and the efficient design of economic mechanisms.

His works represent a successful integration of economic models with computer science analysis methods, and are published both in top economic journals as well as in the top CS conferences and journals. Ron has received an outstanding paper award at the 10th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'09), an Award for Research Cooperation and High Excellence in Science (ARCHES) from the Federal German Ministry of Education and Research (in 2012), and a Marie-Curie IOF fellowship to complete an extended sabbatical at UC Berkeley (2013 – 2015). He was additionally a consultant and an academic visitor to Google, Microsoft research, and Yahoo! Labs.

Venue

信息管理与工程学院  602会议室

上海财经大学

上海市杨浦区武东路100号