Abstract

In this talk, we will present variations of the problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations for the goods. We will define basic fairness concepts such as proportionality and envy-freeness and will discuss their basic properties. Next, we will focus on the maximum Nash welfare allocations and we will explain how they guarantee approximate notions of envy-freeness. Finally, we will define new fairness concepts that are related to the awareness of the agents for the allocation and to their social relations. We will present examples and many open problems.

No advanced or special  mathematical background is needed to follow the talk.

Time

9月3日（周一）14:00-15:00

Speaker

Ioannis Caragiannis (Computer Scientist and Engineer; Diploma, 1996; PhD, 2002) is an Associate Professor at the Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics of the University of Patras, Greece.

His research interests include design and analysis of algorithms, economics and computation, and foundations of machine learning and artificial intelligence.

He has published more than 150 papers in conference proceedings, scientific journals, and books and has participated in basic research projects funded by the European programmes IST/ICT FET, ESF/COST, and ESPRIT LTR and by the Greek state.

Currently, he is involved, as a member of its management committee, in the COST Actions CA15210 “European network for collaboration on kidney exchange programmes (ENCKEP)” and CA16228 “European Network for Game Theory (GAMENET).” He also recently served in the senior program committee of the 19th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2018) and the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2018). Ioannis Caragiannis is a member of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM, SIGACT, SIGECOM), the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), and the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science (EATCS). 

Venue

信息管理与工程学院  602会议室

上海财经大学

上海市杨浦区武东路100号